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and November 1932 Reichstag elections, and there was strong opposition within party ranks to an accommodation with the nazi that did not sufficiently secure the vital interests of those whom the DNVP purportedly represented. All of this suggests that Hugenberg's decision to enter the Hitler cabinet was not an easy one and that i took place in spite of strong personal reservations both on the part o Hugenberg and many of his most ardent supporters.
While the secondary literature on the formation of the Hitler government is by now quite extensive, neither it nor the various studies of Hugenberg's political career have provided an altogether adequate explanation of Hugenberg's role in the negotiations that led to Hitler's installation as chancellor.2 The purpose of this essay, therefore, is to examine the factors that led Hugenberg to set aside his party congress in autumn 1927, Hugenberg launched a determined bid to regain control of the party with an open letter to national party chairman Kuno von Westarp, in which he exhorted the DNVP to purge itself of those who had placed economic self-interest before the struggle for national liberation and to return to the policy of unconditional opposition that had served it so well during the first years of the Weimar Republic.1 A year later, Ilugenberg's efforts were crowned with success when, after a bitter internal party struggle, he was chosen as Westarp's successor to the DNVP party chairmanship.12
Hugenberg's goal as DNVP party chairman was to transform the party from a socially and ideologically heterogeneous conservative conservative veterans' organization that had allied itself with the DNVP and NSDAP in the campaign against the Young Plan, was planning to initiate in an attempt to force the dissolution of the Prussian state parliament.19 Although the leaders of the two rightwing parties had no alternative but to support the referendum, they tried to force the crusade for the dissolution of the Prussian Landtag into a more radical direction than the leaders of the Stahlhelm had planned to take by walking out of the Reichstag on 10 February in an ostensible protest against Briining's alleged violations of Article 54 of the Weimar Constitution.20 While the leaders of the DNVP and Stahlhelm were able to resolve their differences in April 1931 by agreeing not only to co-operate in the second phase of the referendum for the dissolution of the Prussian Landtag, but also to organize a demonstration for the entire national opposition a week or so before the Reichstag reconvened in the autumn,21 Hugenberg's efforts to reach a similar understanding with Hitler were thwarted by the DNVP'S antipathy towards the increasingly radical methods the NSDAP had begun to employ in its struggle against Briining and Hindenburg.22 As a result, it was not until the middle of the summer that Hugenberg was able to meet with Hitler and resolve some of the difficulties that stood in the way of the NSDAP'S co-operation with the other organizations in the national opposition.23
The rapprochement between Hugenberg and Hitler in the summer of 1931 prepared the way for a major demonstration that the DNVP, NSDAP and other right-wing organizations held in the small resort town of Bad Harzburg on 10-11 October, the weekend before the Reichstag was scheduled to reconvene.24 But as plans for the Harzburg demonstration were being finalized, Hitler and the Nazi Party leadership became increasingly apprehensive over the way things were developing. Hitler was particularly infuriated at the way in which the more conservative elements of the national opposition had monopolized planning for the Harzburg rally, thereby making it appear as if he and the NSDAP were actually in the tow of Hugenberg and his associates. As a result, Hitler was not only late for the conference that had been scheduled in Harzburg for the evening of 10
October, but on the following day he insulted the leaders of the Stahlhelm by leaving the podium just as its detachments were being reviewed.25 This bit of impudence precipitated a bitter exchange between Hitler and the Stahlhelm leadership, and it was only through Hugenberg's vigorous intervention that the Nazi Party leader could be dissuaded from leaving the rally before he and the other leaders of the national opposition were scheduled to address the assembled throngs on the evening of 11 October.26 As Hindenburg and Hitler.34 The collapse of the 'Harzburg Front' destroyed the last remnants of Hugenberg's confidence in Hitler's political reliability and set the scene for a bitter polemic between their respective parties in the election campaigns that were held throughout the country over the course of the next six months. While nazi propagandists routinely denounced the DNVP as the party of social and political reaction, Hugenberg and his associates attacked the NSDAP for its social and economic radicalism in a desperate attempt to stem the defection of its predominantly middle-class and peasant supporters. The fact that the two parties pursued radically different policies towards the cabinet that had assumed office in early June 1932 under the chancellorship of Franz von Papen constituted a further strain in relations between the DNVP and NSDAP. For, whereas both parties had been united in their opposition to Papen's predecessor, the Nationalists were far more favourably disposed to an accommodation with the new government than were Hitler and the Nazi Party leadership.37 The Nationalists were particularly critical of the obstructionist tactics that the NSDAP had employed in bringing about the dissolution of the Reichstag on 12 September 1932, and attacked the nazis in the campaign for the November 1932 Reichstag elections for having consistently placed partisan political gains before the unity of the Hugenberg's urgency stemmed not merely from his antipathy towards Schleicher, but also from his deepening concern over the future of the NSDAP. For although Hugenberg and his confederates derived a measure of satisfaction from the NSDAP'S heavy losses in recent national and regional elections,41 they were also concerned that the party's continued decline would destroy whatever prospects there might still have been for a government of national concentration based upon the parties and organizations of the 'Harzburg Front'. In this respect, the leaders of the DNVP were particularly fearful that the rebelliousness on the NSDAP'S left wing might degenerate into a civil war if the party were permanently excluded from power. If nothing else, the mutiny of the Berlin Storm-Troopers (Sturm-Abteilung der NSDAP or SA) against Joseph Goebbels and the local party leadership in late December 1932 only seemed to confirm Nationalist fears that the NSDAP was indeed on the verge of falling apart.42
It was against the background of these developments that Hugenberg insisted that under no circumstances should the Centre b allowed to regain the predominant position it had held througho most of the Weimar Republic. Nor should those forces whose pa history had been characterized by the relentless, yet futile struggle t split the national will, argued Hugenberg, be allowed to sow discord again.
If that is not to happen, if all of our present accomplishments are not to be undone, then that requires above all else unity within the national movement. History will have a hard time understanding why in this serious moment unity is lacking. Our situation at home and abroad is now perhaps more critical than ever. I therefore feel obligated to suggest that we at least meet once again to find out whether that unity cannot be restored. 47 Hugenberg repeated his overture shortly after the beginning of the new year and sent the Nazi Party leader drafts of the proposals he had been working on for the solution of Germany's most pressing economic problems.48 In the meantime, Schleicher's political mandate had begun to unravel. On 11 January 1933 -seven days after Hitler's infamous meeting with Papen in Cologne -the executive committee of the National Rural League adopted a resolution that condemned the Schleicher government for having failed to protect the German farmer not only against unfair competition from abroad, but also against the exploitative policies of finance and industry at home.49 With the publication of this resolution, the RLB officially withdrew its support from the Schleicher cabinet in a move that Although this represented a dramatic retreat from Hindenburg's earlier stand that under no circumstances would he tolerate the 'Bohemian corporal' as chancellor, it evoked little enthusiasm fr Hugenberg, since it not only presupposed an accommodation wi the Centre but, more importantly, entailed a return to the form, if the substance, of parliamentary government. Returning to this issu later in the conversation, Meissner indicated that Hindenburg migh be persuaded to go along with Hitler's appointment as the head of a minority government if his cabinet were supported by the Stahlhelm the National Rural League and industry, and could therefore presen itself as a cabinet of the entire national movement. That would, in Meissner's words, make it impossible 'for one party to rape th other '.58 While Hugenberg was genuinely surprised by Meissner's candour, he remained sceptical, if not apprehensive, about the direction in which events seemed to be moving. His apprehension mounted when, over the course of the next several days, he found himself effectively excluded from the negotiations that were taking place between Hitler, Papen and representatives of the presidential palace.59 Hugenberg's predicament, as Quaatz noted in his diary, was that he desperately wanted to be in the cabinet, but could neither shape nor lead it.60 To be sure, Hugenberg and Schmidt-Hannover met with the NSDAP'S Wilhelm Frick and Hermann Goring on 25 January, but they were unable to reach agreement as to how the current political crisis might be resolved.61 It was not until the afternoon of 27 January that Hugenberg and Hitler were to meet again, this time at Hitler's suggestion and in the presence of Frick, Goring, and SchmidtHannover. G6ring opened the meeting by announcing that Papen had agreed to recommend Hitler's appointment as chancellor to the Reich President and that the Stahlhelm's Franz Seldte had acknowledged the legitimacy of Hitler's claim to the leadership of th cabinet. Confronted by a virtual fait accompli, Hugenberg proposed a number of party associates for ministerial appointments but wa unable to persuade the nazis to go along with his demands for a strong Nationalist presence in the Reich and Prussian cabinets. By the same token, the two party leaders remained equally divided over control o the Prussian state police.62
Realizing that his position was hopeless, Schleicher tendered hi resignation as chancellor in a private audience with Hindenburg o the morning of 28 January. The Reich President promptly commissioned Papen with the task of forming a new government. Later tha afternoon, Papen informed the Nationalists that the chancellorship, along with the Reich and Prussian ministries of the interior, had been offered to the nazis and that he himself had agreed to serve as vice chancellor.63 Frustrated by the way in which he had been excluded from the formation of the new government, Hugenberg dispatched Quaatz to Meissner for clarification. Hugenberg's own preference for a solution to the existing crisis called for the creation of a 'crisi cabinet' or Kampfkabinett headed by himself and Papen. But, a Meissner informed Quaatz on 28 January, this was acceptable neither to the Reich President, who continued to insist upon the formation of a government that rested upon a formal parliamentary majority in the Reichstag, nor the Centre, which had indicated that it would not tolerate a Papen-Hugenberg 'crisis cabinet'.64 Moreover, the concept of a 'crisis cabinet' had also encountered strong opposition among those upon whom Papen was counting most heavily, most notably in the person of Count Lutz von Schwerin-Krosigk, who had served as Minister of Finance in both the Papen and Schleicher cabinets.65 Onc it became clear that the creation of a 'crisis cabinet' was no longer a viable option, Hugenberg and the leaders of the DNVP tried to salvag something of the increasingly desperate political situation in which they found themselves by attaching three conditions to their participation in a majority government with the NSDAP: the 'neutralization' of the police and Reichswehr, the creation of a strong conservative bulwark in Prussia, and Hugenberg's appointment as a 'crisis minister' with exclusive responsibility for the economic, fiscal and agricultural policies of the new government. From the Nationalist perspective, the fulfilment of these conditions was essential if the forces of German conservatism were to 'harness' (bdndigen) Hitler and the nazi movement.66
Of the three conditions the Nationalists sought to attach to their participation in a government of national concentration under Hitler and Papen, only Hugenberg's appointment as a 'crisis minister' with exclusive responsibility for a co-ordinated national economic policy met with no objection from his prospective coalition partners. In the meantime, the Nationalists had pinned their hopes for the establishment of a strong conservative bulwark in Prussia upon the appointment of Friedrich von Winterfeld, chairman of the DNVP Prussian Landtag delegation, as Prussian Minister of the Interior. These hopes, however, had been effectively thwarted when Papen informed the Nationalist Party leadership on the morning of 28 January that the NSDAP would be receiving both the Reich and Prussian ministries of the interior. This, in turn, held immediate implications for Nationalist hopes of 'neutralizing' the Prussian state police. By 'neutralization' the Nationalists meant that the Prussian state police should be purged of all political influence -in this case, social democratic as well as nazi -so that it could serve the state in an ostensibly non-partisan fashion. The nazis, on the other hand, fully intended to use the state police in Prussia and elsewhere to crush the Marxist threat and were unlikely to surrender the enormous tactical advantage they had gained through their control of the Prussian and Reich ministries of the interior. At their meeting on 27 January, the mere suggestion by Hugenberg that the police must not be used as an instrument of'street terror' had provoked an angry response from the Nazi Party leader.67 By 29 January it had become apparent to Hugenberg and his associates that none of the conditions they had regarded as essential for containing Hitler were likely to be met. To be sure, Hugenberg could derive some satisfaction from his appointment as 'economic dictator' of the Hitler cabinet, but this, as his party colleagues lamented, was hardly adequate compensation for the precarious political situation in which the DNVP currently found itself.68 As a result, the leaders of the DNVP felt isolated and bereft of viable political options. Writing in his diary later that evening, Quaatz reflected upon the dilemma in which the DNVP found itself as a result of the series of events it had set in motion with its ultimatum to Schleicher on 21 January:
Within the party the ultimatum had come as an act of deliverance. With a single blow we stood at the centre of events as a sort of pivot; this position, however, is correspondingly dangerous. For all intents and purposes, the Nationalists had manoeuvred themselves into a situation that left them with little, if any, alternative but to join Hitler and Papen in a cabinet of national concentration. Their situation was further complicated by the fact that on the evening of 29 January Hitler had let it be known that, in order to achieve a parliamentary majority in the Reichstag, he would insist upon either new elections or the inclusion of the Centre in the new cabinet. Neither prospect was particularly appealing to the Nationalist Party leadership.70 It was against the background of these developments that Schmidt-Hannover made a last, desperate attempt to prevent the new government from coming into existence. Early on the morning of 30 January, he and Theodor Duesterberg, nominally the Stahlhelm's second-in-command, drove to Seldte's suite in the Hotel Bristol in an attempt to dissuade him from joining the Hitler cabinet and, should that fail, to persuade him to support Hugenberg in his efforts to prevent new elections and to keep the nazis from gaining control of the Prussian state police.71 Frustrated by Seldte's equivocation, the two then travelled to the presidential palace, where an audience with Oskar von Hindenburg, the Reich President's son, proved equally futile.72 From here, Schmidt-Hannover and Duesterberg went to Papen's headquarters, where they found Hugenberg engaged in heavy negotiations. Papen, however, quickly dismissed Hugenberg's objections to the idea of new elections by indicating that this should be decided at some point in the future. As a result, the issue was still unresolved when the two left for the presidential palace for the installation of the new government.73 Hitler's dictatorial aspirations and of the dangers which would result from his appointment as chancellor. If one of the conditions which the Nationalists had originally set for their participation in a coalition government with the NSDAP had been the 'neutralization' of the Reichswehr, it now seemed to Schmidt-Hannover that Blomberg's appointment had effectively delivered the army into Hitler's hands.74 In the meantime, Hugenberg tried once again to wrest a promise from the Nazi Party leader that he would not order new national elections when the prospective cabinet officers assembled in the presidential palace shortly before noon on 30 January for the formal installation of the new government. By this time, Hugenberg had become so adamant in his opposition to new elections that he apparently threatened to withdraw from the cabinet before it could be formally installed in office. This would have effectively sabotaged the cabinet negotiations just as they seemed to be reaching a successful conclusion. Hitler, who had already instructed Goebbels to begin preparations for new national elections,75 tried to reassure the Nationalist Party chairman that the outcome of the elections would have no effect upon the composition of the cabinet. Steadfastly refusing to accede to Hugenberg's demands, Hitler indicated that the matter be left to the ultimate discretion of the cabinet.76
The government that took office on 30 January 1933 was a coalition government predicated upon the assumption that the conservatives around Hugenberg and Papen would be able to restrain the radicalism of the nazi movement and thus use it to stabilize their own social and political hegemony. Although profound differences still separated the Nationalists and their coalition partners on the use of the state police to crush Marxism in the streets, the ideological cement that held this coalition together was first and foremost anti-Marxism. Anti-semitism, by contrast, played virtually no role whatsoever in the negotiations that led to the formation of the Hitler government and was important only in so far as neither Hugenberg nor Papen were prepared to let it stand in the way of an accommodation with Hitler. following day.92 These events, however, were for the most part anti-climactic and only revealed the ultimate poverty of a policy that had effectively delivered Germany into the hands of Hitler and the NSDAP. If Hugenberg had indeed committed 'the greatest stupidity' of his life by joining the Hitler cabinet on 30 January 1933, then this was the result of a strategy that he had conscientiously pursued ever since his election to the DNVP party chairmanship in October 1928 and that in the final analysis left him and his associates with no way out of the political dead-end into which they had manoeuvred themselves. The aim of this strategy was nothing less than the destruction of Weimar democracy and the establishment of a new system of rule that no longer rested upon the will of the people, but sought to restore the dominance of Germany's traditional elites in industry, agriculture and the military. However, that Hitler and not Hugenberg was the principal beneficiary of this strategy is to be explained in part by the fact that from the perspective of Hugenberg and the DNVP leadership the 'backslide into parliamentarism', as it had manifested itself in the formation of the Schleicher cabinet, constituted a far more serious danger to Germany's political future than an alliance with Hitler and National Socialism.
By no means was Hugenberg a naive and unwitting participant in the formation of the Hitler cabinet. He and his associates were, as a careful reading of the Quaatz diary and other primary materials suggests, fully aware of the dangers that were inherent in the course o action they pursued in the second half of January 1933. The ultimatum which the DNVP delivered to the Schleicher government on 21 January was part of a deliberate strategy to bring down the existing cabinet without, however, any clear idea of what might take its place. It was a risky gambit that within six months led to the dissolution o Hugenberg's own party and to his exclusion from any sort of meaningful role in German political life. To be sure, the leaders of the DNVP had hoped to minimize the dangers of their party's alliance with the NSDAP by attaching conditions designed to control and tame the nazi movement, but their negotiating position was too weak to allow them any real influence over the course of events in Berlin. In the fina analysis, neither Papen nor Hindenburg's associates in the presidential palace granted much credence to Nationalist concerns over the need for a conservative counterpoise to the NSDAP in Prussia or for the 'neutralization' of the Prussian police force. As it became clear that the conditions they deemed necessary for 'harnessing' and 'taming' Hitler were not being met, a handful of Hugenberg's own colleagues tried desperately to sabotage the negotiations with Hitler before they could reach a successful conclusion. By this time, however, the course of events had assumed a momentum of its own that neither they nor Hugenberg could halt.
If nothing else, a close examination of the events that surrounded Hugenberg's entry into the Hitler cabinet reveals just how divided the German Right was on the eve of the nazi assumption of power. It would be a serious misreading of the events that led to the formation of the Hitler cabinet in January 1933 to assume that Hugenberg's gambit enjoyed the full or unequivocal support of even his own supporters. For if the leaders of the DNVP were united in their determination to force Schleicher's removal from office and to prevent a 'backslide into parliamentarism', Germany's conservative elite had become so fragmented along structural as well as ideological lines that it was no longer capable of formulating any sort of coherent response to the crisis with which it found itself confronted. The fissures that existed within the DNVP, therefore, were part of a much broader pattern of division and conflict that penetrated deep into the ranks of Germany's conservative elite and that effectively immobilized it in the face of the nazi challenge. In the final analysis, the disunity of the German Right constituted a prerequisite for the nazi assumption of power that may have been every bit as crucial as the collaboration of individual conservatives like Papen and Hugenberg. 
